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1 Introduction
This paper takes multiple equilibria seriously. The presence of poverty traps, or multiple equilibria, has long been a promi-
nent explanation for the vast income differences observed between rich and poor nations. The basic idea can be found in
Malthus, and has often been revisited by economists interested in the problems of development. In this paper, we extend
this line of research by exploring the quantitative properties of a speciﬁc model exhibiting multiple equilibria.
Our starting point is the two sector, variable-returns-to-scale (VRS) model from the trade theory literature. To be more
speciﬁc, we study the production equilibrium of a small open economy with a moderate extent of increasing returns in
non-agriculture (industry and services). This model gives rise to multiplicity for a wide range of parameter values. We then
develop and apply a method for calibrating the model when there is more than one equilibrium. Under the assumption that
we observe economies in equilibrium, we show how to solve for alternative equilibrium allocations, where they exist. Given
the simplicity of the model, the calibration exercise requires only a small number of parameter assumptions, and readily
available data.
We take advantage of this simplicity by calibrating the model for 127 countries. Under the maintained assumptions
of the model, we can infer whether a given country is in a low output or high output equilibrium. We also examine the
conditions on parameters under which a large or small number of the world’s countries might be regarded as in a poverty
trap. Furthermore, by establishing the nature of any alternative equilibrium solution, we can compute the productivity gains
associated with switching from the low output equilibrium to the high output equilibrium. We then compare the current
world income distribution with a counterfactual one, where each country is in its high output equilibrium. This allows us to
study the extent to which the VRS model can account for the observed variation in levels of income across countries.
The exercise also casts light on international differences in total factor productivity (TFP). In economic environments
characterized by multiple equilibria, countries with identical preferences, factor endowments and production technologies
may converge to different long run outcomes. This immediately implies that aggregate TFP may differ across countries,
even when technologies can be costlessly transferred across national borders. Again, our analysis allows us to quantify
this effect. We explore the counterfactual distribution of TFP that would obtain in a world where low output equilibria are
eliminated.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, even for a moderate extent of increasing returns to scale, income differences
acrosslowoutputandhighoutputequilibriaaresizeable. Outputcaneasilyrisebyafactoroftwoorthree. Whilesubstantial,
these differences are much smaller than the output gaps between the world’s richest and poorest economies. The model
cannot explain the vast income differences between, say, the USA and sub-Saharan Africa, without assuming implausibly
strong increasing returns.
Nevertheless, even for a moderate extent of increasing returns, about a quarter of the world’s economies are found to
be in a low output equilibrium. The exact proportion varies with parameter choices, but one ﬁnding is particularly robust:
1the model can explain the low incomes of the poorest, predominantly agricultural economies, relative to middle income
countries. It performs less well in explaining development levels in middle income East Asia and Latin America, relative to
the OECD economies.
This paper’s goals are ambitious and, inevitably, require many qualiﬁcations. We do not use calibration in order to
match the patterns observed in the cross-country data, nor do we provide a formal statistical test of the VRS model. Instead,
our aim is to learn more about the quantitative properties of the model, and its potential for explaining certain features
of the data under plausible parameter assumptions. The exercise illuminates, with relatively little effort, the strengths and
weaknesses of this speciﬁc explanation for underdevelopment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the relationship between our work and
previous research. Section 3 sets out the VRS model and provides some intuition for the presence of multiple equilibria.
Section 4 introduces our calibration strategy. Section 5 describes the data we use and the main parameter assumptions.
Sections 6 and 7 present the central results. Section 8 reports the results of a sensitivity analysis, while Section 9 considers
the implications of the VRS model for returns to capital. Some technical results and a description of our data can be found
in Appendices A to C.
2 Relation to existing literature
Models of multiple equilibria in output levels have a long history in economics. Almost two centuries ago the Reverend
Thomas Malthus sketched the possibility in Book II of his Principles, observing “that there are many countries not es-
sentially different..., which yet, with nearly equal natural capabilities, make very different progress in wealth” (Malthus
1836:310). In the post-World War II period, the now famous contributions of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Nurkse (1954) and
Myrdal (1957) aggressively argued that multiple equilibria were crucial for understanding underdevelopment. Even Solow’s
(1956) seminal paper on the neoclassical growth model discussed possible extensions generating multiple equilibria.
Recent research, with a particular burst of activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has formalized and substantially
extended these early contributions. Key papers include those by Azariadis (1996, 2001), Krugman (1995), Matsuyama
(1991), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Rodríguez-Clare (1996) and Rodrik (1995, 1996). More recently, Ray (2000)
has emphasized the importance of this general approach to understanding development. Despite the long history of theo-
retical work, the possibility of multiplicity has rarely inﬂuenced empirical research.1 This is partly because conventional
regression methods are not well suited to the analysis of multiple equilibria, and are likely to yield misleading results in this
context (Durlauf and Johnson 1995, Durlauf and Quah 1999).2
While it is possible to develop formal statistical tests for the presence of multiple equilibria, as in Bloom, Canning and
Sevilla (2002), doing so is difﬁcult for a number of reasons. The use of more sophisticated statistical methods often requires
larger samples and hence, given the limited number of countries in the world, such techniques can ask a lot of the available
data. One concrete manifestation of these challenges is the continuing debate on whether the ergodic world distribution
is, or is not, bimodal, with competing statistical approaches generating different answers (e.g., Kremer, Onatski and Stock
2001 versus Quah 2001). For these reasons, we do not pursue an estimation-based strategy in this paper, but instead focus
on calibration methods. In particular, we use calibration to explore the quantitative properties of a speciﬁc theoretical
model. As with other calibration exercises, this should not be seen as a test of the model, but rather as an important step in
examining its potential to explain the data. We wish to emphasize our view that the calibration approach pursued here is a
useful complement to, and not a substitute for, direct model estimation.
1This contrasts sharply with the Solow model, which has served as the organizing framework for inﬂuential development accounting and empirical
growth research, as in Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson (1981), Hall and Jones (1999), Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) and Prescott (1998) among many other contributions.
2The presence of multiplicity raises distinctive identiﬁcation issues that are reviewed in detail by Cooper (2001).
2The model we calibrate gives rise to multiplicity in a straightforward way. We consider a small open economy with
two sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture. The outputs of both sectors can be traded on world markets. The agricultural
production technology has constant returns in labor, capital and a ﬁxed factor that we call land. This implies decreasing
returns to the variable inputs. In contrast, the non-agricultural production technology has increasing returns. This model
is a speciﬁc example of the variable-returns-to-scale (VRS) models of trade theory. It is well known that VRS models can
give rise to non-uniqueness, and also have other properties that distinguish them from the more familiar constant returns to
scale case.3 Panagariya (1988) argues that a VRS model can explain a wide variety of stylized facts about the development
process.
The introduction of increasing returns creates well known difﬁculties for modelling. In this paper, following much of the
VRS literature, we assume that increasing returns arise through a sector-speciﬁc output-generated externality. This greatly
simpliﬁes the analysis, because we can retain the standard assumptions of perfect competition and marginal productivity
factor pricing.
Inthemodelwecalibrate, thepresenceofmultipleequilibriadependscruciallyuponanexternalityinthenon-agricultural
sector. The empirical importance of such externalities remains open to debate. In an inﬂuential contribution, Caballero and
Lyons (1992) present statistical evidence consistent with substantial externalities across industries. Later work has some-
times cast doubt on the generality of this ﬁnding, but one of the contributions of our paper is to show that multiple equilibria
can play an important role in generating income differences across countries even when the extent of increasing returns is
very modest.4
Moreover, broader support for the importance of increasing returns can be found in the cross-country empirical work of
Backus et al (1992), in the analysis of trade ﬂows by Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002), and in the work on gravity explanations
of trade by Evenett and Keller (2002). The paper by Antweiler and Treﬂer suggests that increasing returns can be found in
about a third of goods-producing industries and form an important source of comparative advantage. Again, their evidence
is potentially consistent with the presence of industry-wide externalities, although other effects may also be at work.
Although the econometric evidence for external effects is mixed, there remain strong reasons for exploring the relevance
of the VRS model. A number of empirical regularities suggest a role for increasing returns over at least some range of
production, notably the well-known tendency for economic activity to be spatially concentrated. External economies or
increasing returns can also be useful in explaining business cycles and intra-industry trade ﬂows. As we discuss further
below, the VRS model can also account for the “twin peaks” in the cross-country distribution of TFP identiﬁed by Feyrer
(2003). For all these reasons, we view the VRS model as a natural starting point for a quantitative study of multiplicity.
3T h e m o d e l
This section describes two versions of a VRS model with multiplicity. The ﬁrst is a simple one-factor model that we will use
to illustrate the principles behind the multiplicity result and our calibration procedure. The second, more complex model is
the one that forms the basis for our main calibration results.
In the simple model there is only one factor of production, labor. There are diminishing returns to labor in agriculture
and, due to an externality, increasing returns to labor in non-agriculture. We assume that the relative price of the agricultural
good is ﬁxed by world prices. We also assume that labor is paid its private marginal product in both sectors (implicitly a
ﬁxed factor in agriculture receives the remainder of agricultural income).
3The VRS trade literature is reviewed by Choi and Yu (2003). Additional key references include Kemp and Schweinberger (1991) and Panagariya
(1981, 1988).
4The empircal literature on external economies is brieﬂy surveyed by Benhabib and Farmer (1996, p. 434-435) and Farmer (1999, p. 149-152 and
171-173). Burnside (1996) argues that much of the empirical literature suffers from severe identiﬁcation problems. More recently, Conley and Dupor
(2003) have addressed some of these problems and found that returns to scale are generally constant or modestly increasing, where the precise results
depend on the instrument set.
3The agricultural production function is:
Ya = AaLφ
a
where 0 <φ<1. For non-agriculture, we introduce a simple form of externality, namely that the output of each individual
ﬁrm is an increasing function of total non-agricultural employment. Using j to index the ﬁrms, we have Ynj = AnLnjLλ
n
where Ynj and Lnj are the output and employment of ﬁrm j and Ln is total employment in this sector. The externality
parameter is greater than zero (λ>0). Aggregating over ﬁrms we then have:
Yn = AnL1+λ
n
Firms set employment levels Lnj without taking into account their effect on total employment Ln. Hence, the private
marginal product and wage in the non-agricultural sector is given by wn = AnLλ
n.
We focus on equilibria with incomplete specialization for which the wage is the same in both sectors. Deﬁning a =
La/L where L = La + Ln is total employment, labor market equilibrium implies:






This equation will usually yield two solutions for the agricultural employment share, a,w h e r e0 <a<1. This is the multi-
plicity result. The underlying intuition is that, due to the externality, the labor demand curve for the non-agricultural sector
as a whole is upward sloping: as the sector expands, it can afford to pay higher wages, due to increased productivity.5 Hence
this upward-sloping curve may intersect more than once with the downward sloping labor demand curve in agriculture.
We now describe the full model that will form the basis for our quantitative results. It is a general equilibrium model
of production for a small open economy with two sectors, in which both goods can be traded. As is often assumed in such
models, the economy is closed to international ﬂows of capital and labor. Capital and labor are mobile between sectors,
while there is a ﬁxed factor in agricultural production, which we call land. The assumption of a sector-speciﬁc externality
in non-agriculture creates the possibility of non-uniqueness in equilibrium allocations of labor and capital, for reasons that
we will discuss further below.6
Aggregate output is the sum of agricultural output, Ya, and non-agricultural output, Yn:
Y = Ya + Yn
where the assumptions about trade, and appropriate choice of units for the two outputs, allow the prices of both goods to be
normalized to one.
We assume that all factors of production are fully employed and that factors receive their private marginal products. We
treat the agricultural sector as made up of a large number of landowners and perfectly competitive, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.
These ﬁrms produce using a Cobb-Douglas technology that has constant returns to physical capital, land and labor. Land is
rented from the landowners, and all ﬁrms pay the same factor costs. Under these assumptions we can restrict attention to a
representative ﬁrm, and write total agricultural output as:
Ya =[ K − Kn]α[R]β[Aah(L − Ln)]1−α−β (1)
5This is the case even though the demand for labor of individual ﬁrms is not upward sloping. Note also that the intuition is similar to that in the one
sector business cycle model analysed in Farmer (1999, p.156). The simple one-factor, two-sector model is closely related to models studied by Panagariya
(1981) and Ethier (1982b), both of whom provide further intuition for the presence of multiple equilibria.
6In the theoretical literature on poverty traps, the presence of external economies arises from explicitly modelled microfoundations, such as a division
of labor process, as in Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Rodrik (1996). Here we concentrate on a simpler model which captures the same fundamental ideas.
4Where K, L,a n dR refer respectively to the aggregate (economy-wide) stock of capital, the total labor force, and a ﬁxed
quantity of land. For the sake of our later empirical work on productivity differences, we are also allowing the effectiveness
of labor to be augmented by an index of human capital, h.7 Labor-augmenting technology is indexed by Aa.
In the non-agricultural sector, output for ﬁrm j =1 ,...,Jin non-agriculture is given by:
Ynj = f (Knj,A nhLnj)v(Yn)
= f (k,Anh)v(Yn)Lnj
where f(.) exhibits constant returns to scale and k ≡ Kn/Ln is the capital-labor ratio. The second line follows from the
use of constant returns technology by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. As is standard, the assumption that all ﬁrms within this
sector pay the same factor costs, and use the same technology, ensures that all ﬁrms choose the same capital-labor ratio.
Note that each ﬁrm’s output is also a function of total non-agricultural output, Yn,w h i c hc o u l dr e ﬂect the presence of
agglomeration economies or other external effects. In order to retain a standard treatment of competitive equilibrium, we
assume that each ﬁrm is small enough to disregard its effect on total output. We write total non-agricultural output as:
Yn =
X









= f (Kn,A nhLn)v(Yn)
For simplicity, we will take f(.) to be Cobb-Douglas, given by f(.)=Kγ




n . Then output in non-agriculture is
Yn =[ Kn]γ(1+λ)[AnhLn](1−γ)(1+λ) (2)
where the key parameter λ captures the extent of increasing returns for the sector as a whole. For example λ =0 .3 implies
that if all non-agricultural ﬁrms simultaneously increase their use of capital and labor by 10 percent, total non-agricultural
output would rise by 13 percent (from 1.11.3 ≈ 1.13). The presence of increasing returns means that labor productivity
depends on the scale of the sector.
The model is completed by imposing factor market equilibrium conditions. We assume that capital is perfectly mobile
between sectors, so that the private returns to capital are equalized, giving8
rn = ra (3)
The second equilibrium condition applies to the labor market. Here we leave open the possibility of a sustained wage
differential:
wn = wa(1 + δ) (4)
This differential could reﬂect costs of migration or disutility from urban life, or perhaps some degree of risk aversion
together with a lack of informal insurance mechanisms in urban areas.9 As we will see in calibrating the model, the data
appear to imply substantial intersectoral wage differentialsunder plausible parameter assumptions. Therefore we allow such
7From the perspective of calibrating the model for individual countries, our decision to augment labor in both sectors by the same skills factor, h,i s
equivalent to merely changing the scale of the productivity terms Aa and An. Nevertheless, we choose to include an explicit role for human capital at this
stage, because cross-country variation in skills will inﬂuence our later calculations of international variation in measures of productivity.
8The results are easily generalized to allow for a permanent differential in rental rates across sectors.
9Banerjee and Newman (1998) discuss insurance mechanisms in the context of a dual economy. Caselli and Coleman (2001) analyse a model in which
a cost of acquiring skills needed for the urban sector leads to a wage differential.
5differentials to be a potential feature of the equilibrium solution of the model.10
An equilibrium for our model is deﬁned by an intersectoral allocation of capital and labor such that equations (3) and
(4) hold simultaneously.11 These equilibrium conditions are typically satisﬁed by more than one allocation of labor and
capital, and in the next section we present conditions which ensure two interior equilibria. These different allocations will
be associated with different levels of aggregate output per worker and TFP, and also with different factor shares and returns
to capital and labor. As in the simpler model, the multiplicity property is driven by the externality in the non-agricultural
sector, which yields returns to scale that are increasing for the non-agricultural sector as a whole. Given that capital is
mobile, the externality offsets diminishing returns to labor. There will be a range of intersectoral labor allocations for which
wages in non-agriculture are increasing in the number of people employed in the sector, even though labor demand curves
are always downward sloping at the ﬁrm level.
To see this more formally, we ﬁrst note that if capital mobility ensures that rental rates are equalized, the capital stock
employed in the non-agricultural sector, Kn, will be a function of non-agricultural employment Ln and a vector of ﬁxed
parameters and constants that we denote by
θ =( λ,γ,α,β,K,D,L,h,Aa,A n).
H e n c ew ec a nw r i t eKn = ϕ(Ln,θ) and this implies that the wage in each sector depends on Ln and θ alone. In terms of
an equilibrium condition,
wn(Ln;θ)=( 1+δ)wa(Ln;θ). (5)
This reduces our two equilibrium conditions to a single equation in one unknown, namely non-agricultural employment Ln.
Figure 1 graphs the right and left-hand-sides of (5) for the case with no equilibrium wage differential (δ =0 ). These lines
show agricultural and non-agricultural wages as a function of non-agricultural employment, so an equilibrium is deﬁned
by the intersection of these two curves. The ﬁgure illustrates a case where the curves intersect twice, corresponding to the
presence of two interior equilibria.
We end our description of the model with an important digression, on the relevance of dynamics to the VRS model. In
calibrating the model, we will be comparing outcomes under alternative static equilibria, and we will not explicitly specify
a mechanism for disequilibrium factor adjustment. Consideration of the dynamics remains relevant, however. Depending
on the form of the adjustment mechanisms for capital and labor, one of the equilibria may be locally unstable, and thus
unlikely to be observed in practice.
Nevertheless, we can establish that local stability for both the interior equilibria is a possible outcome, given a suitably
speciﬁed intersectoral labor migration process. This is a surprising result since standard approaches to stability analysis
- for example positing a Marshallian adjustment process with δ =0as depicted in Figure 1 - would imply that the ﬁrst
interior equilibrium is unstable.12 This is not true, however, provided there is a ﬁxed cost of switching sectors.13 In this case
there will be a range of wage differentials which are insufﬁcient to cover the ﬁxed cost, creating a sphere of stability around
both of the equilibria depicted in Figure 1.
We can alsoshowlocal stability of both interiorequilibria inthe context of a fullyspeciﬁed migration model, based upon
rational and forward-looking decisions. To do this, we build on an insight of Howitt and McAfee (1988). Local stability of
the ﬁrst interior equilibria can be obtained when, in addition to the positive externality emphasized above, a small ‘crowding
10The extent of the differential will have implications for the output gain associated with an equilibrium switch. We explore this issue in our sensitivity
analysis later in the paper.
11There is another equilibrium, in which all the labor force will be engaged in agricultural production. Since this is never observed in the data, the paper
considers only interior equilibria, corresponding to incomplete specialization.
12This feature is familiar from related models in the literature, including Panagariya (1981), Diamond (1982), Ethier (1982a, 1982b), Krugman (1991),
and Matsuyama (1991).
13We are grateful to Michael Kremer for this observation.
6Figure 1: INCREASING RETURNS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA NOTES: The ﬁgure depicts the labor demand curves for non-
agriculture, wn(Ln;θ), and agriculture, wa(Ln;θ), respectively. Equilibria are deﬁned by the intersection of the two curves. The
arrows illustrate the dynamics of the system when labor follows a Marshallian adjustment process, where migration between sectors takes
place at a rate proportional to the current wage differential.
diseconomy’ is introduced.14 The crowding diseconomy means that the cost of intersectoral labor migration is increasing
in non-agricultural employment, and this mechanism can produce local stability of all interior equilibria. In the speciﬁc
example of the appendix, one equilibrium is a sink and the other a saddle point. Since the details of our stability analysis
are not essential to grasping the main ideas and concerns of the paper - although essential to making them rigorous - we
leave a full treatment to Appendix A.
4 Calibration strategy
This section now describes our strategy for calibrating the model. Throughout, we will use a to denote agriculture’s share of
employment, as observed in the data, and s to denote agriculture’s share of output, again as observed in the data. Note that
the output share in both the model and the data corresponds to the nominal share of value added, as evaluated at domestic
relative prices. Our calibration method is fully consistent with relative prices that differ across countries, perhaps because
of iceberg transport costs, for example.
We assume that we observe the world in equilibrium. More precisely, we assume that the agricultural employment and
output shares observed in the data correspond to one of the possible equilibrium allocations. Under this assumption, we
can solve for alternative equilibrium allocations in a way that greatly restricts the need for parameter assumptions and data.
This makes the calibration exercise unusually straightforward.15
14The interaction of agglomeration economies and crowding diseconomies in the determination of city size is one theme in the new economic geography
literature. See Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
15Although the assumption that we observe the world in equilibrium may appear a strong one, we have experimented with allowing for simple forms of
disequilibrium. These experiments have not modiﬁed our general ﬁndings.
7Given the observed sectoral structure of employment and output, we use the assumption of intersectoral capital mobility
to solve for the sectoral allocations of capital that are compatible with equilibrium. Using the production technologies as
well, this allows us to reduce the equilibrium conditions (3) and (4) to a single non-linear equation. Given our assumption
that the observed data correspond to one equilibrium solution, this equation depends upon only the technology parameters
(λ,γ,α,β) and the agricultural output and employment shares. We can solve this equation numerically to identify all the
labor allocations that satisfy the requirements for equilibrium. These solutions will include, by construction, the observed
allocation, but also any others consistent with equilibrium.
Thegreatstrengthofourapproachisthatitcircumventstheneedfordataonsuchhard-to-measurevariablesasthecapital
stock, total employment and sectoral TFP levels. Initially this may seem counter-intuitive, but we can brieﬂy illustrate the
underlying principle by returning to the simple one-factor model described at the start of Section 3. We indicated that, in
the simple model, any interior equilibrium allocation of labor (with agricultural employment share a) must satisfy:






Denote the left-hand side as g(a;φ,λ). Note that for an observed value of a and assumed values for φ and λ, g(a;φ,λ) is a
known quantity. If there is any other equilibrium labor allocation (which we denote as b) it must satisfy an equation of the
same form:






Combining the above two equations means that we can write an equation directly relating the observed employment share,
a, to the alternative equilibrium allocation, b:









Since our assumptions imply that g(a;φ,λ) is a known quantity, we can solve for alternative equilibrium allocations by
ﬁnding another solution b such that (6) holds. This illustrates that we do not need to know anything about Aa, An,o rL to
derive the alternative equilibrium solution. Instead, all we need to know is the form of the equation g(.;φ,λ) and the value
of the employment share found in the data, a.
This principle carries over directly to the more complex model that we calibrate, and to which we now return. We again
reduce the equilibrium conditions to one equation and one unknown, where the unknown is the alternative solution for an
equilibrium employment share, b, given the observed employment share, a. Appendix B shows that our model implies:
g(b) − g(a)=0 (7)













Appendix B also shows that, under the parameter restriction






there will almost always be two solutions to (7).16 One of these solutions will be the observed agricultural employment
share, a. The other solution will be the other possible equilibrium allocation of labor, b.
16Our parameter choices, to be discussed later, will imply that the restriction is satisﬁed for almost all of the countries in our data set.
8How can we distinguish whether a given country is in a low output or high output equilibrium? The most obvious
method is to solve (7) numerically and compare the alternative solution, b, with the observed employment share, a.T h i s
is easily done by using Newton’s method to solve for the roots of (7). An alternative method for inferring the nature of an
equilibrium is available, however. Appendix B shows that it is possible to compare the observed employment share a with












[α + β + λ − γ(1 + λ)]
(9)
where a country is in a high output equilibrium when a<a ∗. Note that for a greater extent of increasing returns (higher λ)
the country-speciﬁc threshold a∗ will be lower for each country. This implies that there will be fewer countries for which
the observed agricultural employment share is low enough to indicate a high output equilibrium.
As well as assigning countries to equilibria, our framework allows us to compute the ratio of output in the alterna-
tive equilibrium allocation of labor to agriculture (here denoted b) to that in the observed equilibrium (with agricultural







































This equation reveals yet another advantage of the simplicity of the VRS model. We can quantify the output effects of
equilibrium switching very easily, using our existing parameter assumptions and data. Again, we do not require knowledge
of any of the sectoral TFP parameters or factor endowments.
5 Data and assumptions
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the data and parameter assumptions that will be required to calibrate the VRS model. In
assigning each country to a low or high output equilibrium, we require data on agriculture’s share of employment and value
added (aand s in our notation). These data are taken from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2000, supplemented
with other sources where necessary. We will also use data from Hall and Jones (1999), and data on the stock of agricultural
land from the FAO Yearbook, when examining international differences in total factor productivity later in the paper. The
full data set is described in more detail in Appendix C.
For the three technology parameters, our benchmark case is γ =0 .35, α =0 .40 and β =0 .20.17 We have based
the value for the non-agricultural capital share, γ,o nt h ea g g r e g a t ec a p i t a ls h a r eo f t e nu s e di ng r o w t ha c c o u n t i n g( s e ef o r
example Collins and Bosworth 1996). Our ﬁgures for the capital and labor shares in agriculture (α and β) are similar to
those used in the GTAP global trade project described in Hertel (1997), which has drawn together data on factor shares from
a variety of countries. We have also examined the factor shares implicit in the Martin and Mitra (2001) estimates of a CRS
translog production function for agriculture. Their estimates, based on data from the mid-1960s to the present, yield factor
shares similar to those adopted here. Later in the paper we will show how our ﬁndings on the incidence of poverty traps
vary with alternative choices for γ, α and β.
17As is standard in the comparative growth literature we assume γ, α, β and λ do not vary across countries. This appears the most sensible approach
given the lack of reliable data on sectoral factor shares in developing countries.
9One partial check that our parameter assumptions are plausible is to consider their implications for the aggregate labor
share. This share is simply a weighted average of the sectoral labor shares, where the weights are the shares of each sector
in nominal value added. Since our production functions are Cobb-Douglas and factors receive their marginal products, the
aggregate labor share is:
η = s(1 − α − β)+( 1− s)(1− γ)
In our data set, the value of the agricultural output share, s, ranges from 0.3% to 69.3%, with a median of 15.7%.T h i si m -
plies that the aggregate labor share, under our parameter assumptions, will vary between around 48% inthemost agricultural
countries to around 65% in the least agricultural, with a median of about 61%. Measurement of the aggregate capital share
is made difﬁcult, especially in developing countries, by self-employment and unincorporated enterprises (Gollin 2002).
Nevertheless, the range of capital shares implicit in our calibration exercise does not look inconsistent with the available
data.
The ﬁnal parameter to consider is λ, which captures the strength of the externality in non-agricultural production. We
will report calibration results based on a wide range of values. Caballero and Lyons (1992) ﬁnd external economies large
enough to be consistent with a value for λ of roughly 0.20 to 0.30. Our quantitative exercise will show that even low values
for λ, on the order of λ ≈ 0.10, can generate interesting results.
6 What can the VRS model explain?
We now calibrate the model for 127 countries, as observed in 1988, where the sample is that of Hall and Jones (1999).18
Under the maintained assumptions of our model, we can derive both of the possible interior equilibrium allocations of labor,
where two exist. We can infer the nature of a country’s equilibrium, low output or high output, and calculate the ratio of
output in the high output equilibrium to that in the low. We can also assess the potential contribution of multiplicity to
international variation in output levels, and explore the implications of the model for the world distribution of income.
We begin by presenting the implications of multiplicity for the international pattern of sectoral structure. Recall that, for
each country, we observe an equilibrium allocation of employment, while our calibration exercise allows us to compute an
alternative equilibrium allocation implied by the model. Figure 2 presents a kernel density plot for the share of employment
that is engaged in non-agriculture. The solid line is the distribution observed in the data, while the dotted lines are the
counterfactual densities that would obtain if all countries were in their high output equilibrium. (These distributions vary
depending on the assumed extent of increasing returns.) As is apparent from the ﬁgure, while the actual sectoral distribution
of labor is weakly bimodal, the effect of eliminating low output equilibria is to make the distribution of employment patterns
look unimodal, so that economies converge in sectoral structure. Note also that the effects of multiplicity are concentrated
among the most agricultural economies, an observation that we return to below.
We now address the question posed in the title of our paper, namely, how much of the international variation in output
per worker can multiple equilibria explain? To answer this question, we compute summary measures of the cross-country
inequality in output per worker. We use inequality measures that are decomposable, so that after dividing our sample of
countries into two groups, those in a low and those in a high output equilibrium, we can decompose the sources of inequality
into its ‘within-group’ and ‘between-group’ components. Note that the assignment of countries to one group or the other,
and hence the inequality decomposition, will vary with the assumed extent of increasing returns.
We carryout theinequalitydecompositionsbased ontwodifferent summarymeasuresof inequalityin output perworker.
The ﬁrst measure is a decomposable ‘Generalized Entropy’ index, due to Shorrocks (1980), with a parameter value of two.
This measure is equal to one-half of the coefﬁcient of variation squared, and so has a simple relation to the variance. The
18All the calibration experiments were implemented using a program written in Mathematica that is available from the authors on request.
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Figure 2: LABOR ALLOCATIONS ACROSS HIGH AND LOW OUTPUT EQUILIBRIA
NOTES: Kernel density estimates for the observed distribution of employment shares across countries, and a selection of counterfac-
tuals, as discussed in the text. Bandwidths were chosen using Sheather and Jones’ (1991) plug-in method. The kernel is a univariate
standard normal density function.
second measure we use is the Theil index of inequality.
These two decompositions are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1, for ﬁve different values of λ. The within-
group fraction, corresponding to the proportion of inequality due to the within-group dispersion in levels of income, is
denoted W
I (%). The between-group fraction, corresponding to the proportion of overall inequality due to differences in
income levels between those countries in a low output equilibrium and those in a high output one, is denoted B
I (%).T h e
between-group component provides an upper bound on the extent of the cross-country inequality in output per worker that
might be attributed to multiple equilibria.
The results from this exercise are quite dramatic. For the highest values of λ that we examine, we can assign more than
half of the inequality in living standards to differences in output levels between those countries in a low output equilibrium
and those in a high output one. Even for a value of λ as low as 0.05, our inequality decompositions assign 18 to 28 percent
of international inequality to between-group differences. It is essential to note, however, that income levels may vary across
low and high equilibrium countries for reasons other than the low or high nature of their current equilibrium. Countries
in a low output equilibrium will typically have other characteristics that lead to low output per worker. In this case our
decomposition provides only an upper bound on the variation in the cross-country data due to multiple equilibria.
To address this problem, column (3) reports an alternative experiment. First, we compute the variance in the logarithm
of output per worker across countries. Next, we force all countries in a low output equilibrium into their alternative, high
output equilibrium, calculate the associated increase in output, and then recalculate the variance for this hypothetical or
counterfactual distribution. By computing the ratio of the two variances, we can see what would happen to the cross-country
variation in living standards if all countries in a low output equilibrium were to switch to their high equilibrium.
Even under this new approach, for a value of λ of 0.20 we can explain around two-ﬁfths of the international variance
in log output per worker. Note that in contrast to our ﬁrst approach, this method probably understates the amount of output
variationdue to multiple equilibria. Thisis because it ignores some dynamic or general equilibriumeffects that might follow
an equilibrium switch, like capital accumulation and increases in schooling.
Next, we ask a closely related question. What would the world distribution of income look like, if all countries were in a

















λ =0 .05 81.91 8 .17 2 .02 8 .0 0.146
λ =0 .10 70.52 9 .55 7 .54 2 .5 0.253
λ =0 .20 61.43 8 .64 9 .95 0 .1 0.393
λ =0 .30 53.94 6 .14 4 .75 5 .3 0.481
λ =0 .50 45.95 4 .13 9 .96 0 .1 0.593
Table 1: MULTIPLICITY AND THE DISPERSION OF INCOME LEVELS
NOTES: Columns (1) and (2) report inequality decompositions. The extent of inequality in output per worker is partitioned into a
within-group component (
W
I (%)) and a between-group component (
B
I (%)). The two groups are countries in low output equilibria
and high output equilibria. The decomposition uses a ‘Generalized Entropy’ measure for inequality with a parameter equal to two (see
Mookherjee and Shorrocks 1982) and the Theil coefﬁcient. The former measure is identical to one-half the cofﬁcient of variation squared.
Column (3) takes a different approach to quantifying the impact of multiple equilibria on the world distribution of income, and reports
one minus the ratio of the counterfactual variance in the log of output per worker (that would be observed if all countries were in their
high output equilibrium) to the variance observed in the data.
may be bimodal, or at least tending towards that form. We investigate whether the VRS model can explain this feature. For
simplicity, we do not model the general equilibrium effects that operate at the level of the world as a whole.19
Figure 3 plots kernel density estimates for the actual distribution of output per worker (the solid line) and a selection
of our counterfactual distributions, generated by placing all countries in their high output equilibrium. Clearly, the poverty
traps implied by the VRS model are mainly restricted to the poorest countries. This model appears best suited to explaining
income differences between the poorest, predominantly agricultural countries and middle income countries, rather than
differences between middle income countries and the OECD.
A remaining question is the size of the output gains associated with a switch to the high output equilibrium. It is clear
that, to be of practical interest, a theoretical model of multiplicity should yield equilibria that greatly differ in termsof output
per worker. Table 2 offers some insight into this question for our model. We consider a range of cases, corresponding to
different values of the externality parameter λ.
We focus on columns (1) and (2) initially. These columns report the number of countries found to be in a low and
high output equilibrium respectively. Importantly, even with a moderate extent of increasing returns (λ =0 .10), we ﬁnd
that roughly a quarter of the countries in our sample are found to be in a low output equilibrium. With a greater extent of
increasing returns, the VRS model implies a greater incidence of poverty traps, as indicated previously.
In column (3), we report the mean and median output ratio across the high and low equilibria for countries found to be
in a low output equilibrium. We can see that if low output equilibrium economies switched to their high output equilibrium
then output per head would approximately double, where the exact ﬁgures depend on returns to scale in the two sectors,
and the characteristics of the individual countries.20 The median output gain is similar to the mean, so output gains of this
magnitude are not unrepresentative. As noted previously, the output gains are likely to be underestimates, which would be
magniﬁed in the presence of endogenous investment in physical capital or schooling.
While these are substantial output gains, they reinforce our conclusion that the model has greatest power in explaining
differences between the low end and the middle of the world income distribution. This is consistent with the common idea
that poverty trap models are best at illuminating the transition to ‘modern economic growth’ (in the sense of Kuznets 1966)
rather than the differences between middle income countries and the OECD economies.
19The simpliﬁcation here is to treat world prices as ﬁxed throughout. In principle, we should allow world prices to vary as patterns of sectoral structure
change. This is an important consideration if a high proportion of economies are found to be in a low output equilibrium.
20There are several inﬂuences on this output gain: increasing returns in non-agriculture, decreasing returns in agriculture, and the differential in the
marginal product of labor across sectors. We will examine this issue further in Section 8 below.
127 8 9 10 11































Figure 3: MULTIPLICITY AND THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME (DENSITY ESTIMATES)
NOTES: This ﬁgure graphs kernel density estimates for the observed distribution of the logarithm of output per worker across countries,
and for the counterfactual distributions that would obtain if all countries were in their high output equilibrium. The cases considered are











λ =0 .05 21 (16.5%) 106 (83.5%) 1.55/1.31
λ =0 .10 33 (26.0%) 94 (74.0%) 1.70/1.53
λ =0 .20 44 (34.6%) 83 (65.4%) 2.03/1.70
λ =0 .30 56 (44.1%) 71 (55.9%) 2.20/1.74
λ =0 .50 67 (52.8%) 60 (47.2%) 2.69/2.11
Table 2: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA FOR OUTPUT
NOTES: The table reports the distribution of equilibrium assignments for various values of λ. Column (3) reports the mean and median
ratio of output in the high output equilibrium to that in the low, for countries found to be in a low output equilibrium.
7 Multiple equilibria and aggregate TFP
In this section, we explore the implications of the VRS model for understanding international differences in total factor
productivity (TFP). Several researchers have argued that substantial differences in aggregate TFP are needed to explain
the observed variation in output per worker across countries. Some important contributions include those of Hall and
Jones (1999), Klenow and Rodriguez-Claré (1997), and Prescott (1998). Subsequent research has focused on developing
theoretical explanations for these TFP differences, as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Basu and Weil (1998), and Caselli
and Coleman (2000).
It is possible that some of the international variation in aggregate TFP reﬂects the presence of multiple equilibria, rather
than technology differences. Consider two countries identical in terms of preferences, technologies and factor endowments,
but where one is in a low output equilibrium while the other is in a high output equilibrium. A ‘levels accounting’ exercise
in the tradition of Hall and Jones (1999) will identify a difference in aggregate total factor productivity, even though the
sectoral productivity parameters are constant across the two countries.
One reason to study this effect can be found in the work of Feyrer (2003). He ﬁnds that the possible bimodality in
13the world distribution of income is largely explained by bimodality in total factor productivity, rather than in endowments
of physical capital or human capital. The VRS model naturally gives rise to bimodality in TFP, whereas other models of
multiplicity often imply that bimodality would arise in the distributions of physical or human capital, rather than in TFP.
Toinvestigate thisfurther, we will compare the crosscountry dispersionof a standardmeasure ofaggregate TFP with the
dispersion that would be observed if all countries were in their high output equilibrium.21 We will show that the VRS model
can indeed account for a signiﬁcant fraction of the international variation in aggregate TFP. For comparison with previous
work on TFP differences, we will take into account international differences in human capital. Our adjustments are identical
in form to those of Hall and Jones (1999). The basic idea is to construct units of ‘effective’ labor that are compatible with
the Mincerian wage regressions of labor economics. We deﬁne h = eφ(E),w h e r eφ(E) is the efﬁciency of a worker
with E years of schooling relative to a worker with no schooling. The form of φ(.) is piecewise linear as constructed and
parameterized by Hall and Jones (1999). For simplicity, we assume that workers in agriculture and non-agriculture are
equally well educated, so effective labor in sector i is then hLi,w h e r ei = n,a.
We calculate aggregate TFP using Törnqvist comparisons between individual countries and the world mean, as in
Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson (1981). To make these comparisons, we use the aggregate factor shares implied
by our model. Let ηL,i, ηR,i and ηK,i be the aggregate income shares for labor, land, and capital in country i.U n d e rt h e
assumptions of our model, it is easily shown that these shares are equal to:
ηL,i = si(1− α − β)+( 1− si)(1 − γ) (11)
ηR,i = siβ (12)
ηK,i = siα +( 1− si)γ (13)
where si is agriculture’s share of output in country i. We then compute the logarithm of aggregate TFP relative to its world
mean:









































where a line over a variable indicates an average over the countries in our sample.
To obtain the counterfactual distribution of TFP, we force all countries into their high output equilibrium, recalculate
(11) to (13) using the new sectoral structure of value added, and then recalculate (14). Table 3 shows the results for various
assumptions about the externality parameter, λ. According to the VRS model, up to 30 per cent of the observed variation in
the logarithm of aggregate TFP can be explained by multiplicity. Figure 4 shows the cross-country distribution of aggregate
TFP and the impact of multiple equilibria on this distribution. The solid line is a kernel density estimate for the observed
distribution of the logarithm of TFP. The two dashed lines are density estimates for the counterfactual distributions when
λ =0 .10 and λ =0 .30 and all countries are in their high output equilibrium. Clearly, allowing for multiplicity leads to
a tightening of the aggregate TFP distribution, and moves the distribution towards one that is single-peaked. Yet there is
sufﬁcient remaining variation in TFP that the ‘costless transfer’ view of technology continues to appear problematic, even
under the assumptions of the VRS model.
Our framework also allows us to investigate productivity measures at the level of sectors, or An and Aa in our notation.
21Although our two sector model allows a more sophisticated decomposition of output differences, based on measurement of productivity at the level
of the two sectors, here we concentrate on the aggregate decompositions favored by most researchers.
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¯ ηL ¯ ηD ¯ ηK
TFP (Actual) 0.234 − 0.600 0.040 0.360
TFP (λ =0 .05) 0.200 14.50 .608 0.034 0.358
TFP (λ =0 .10) 0.177 24.1 0.614 0.029 0.357
TFP (λ =0 .20) 0.166 29.1 0.622 0.022 0.356
TFP (λ =0 .30) 0.169 27.6 0.628 0.018 0.354
TFP (λ =0 .50) 0.203 13.1 0.635 0.012 0.353
Table 3: MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF TFP
NOTES: The table lists the variance of the log of aggregate TFP (Column (1)). TFP is calculated using the Christensen, Cummings
and Jorgenson (1981) method for the observed data, and then for the counterfactual data obtained by placing all countries in their high
output equilibrium. The percentage of the variance due to multiple equilibria, column (2), is then calculated as one minus the ratio of the
counterfactual variance of TFP to the observed variance of TFP. Column (3) reports the average factor shares implied by our model for
the observed and counterfactual data.
Given the two sector structure of the VRS model, these are the most appropriate indices of the technologies used by a given
country. It is easy to use the techniques in this paper to compute an estimate of TFP for each of the two sectors, and we are
exploring this in ongoing research (see Chanda and Dalgaard 2003 for a related contribution).
8 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we consider whether our main results are sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions. The ﬁrst part of
the section investigates how the incidence of poverty traps will vary with assumptions on the technology parameters α, β,
γ and λ. The remainder of the section shows that our main results are not particularly sensitive to reducing the intersectoral
differential in the marginal product of labor that is implicit in our previous calculations.
We earlier indicated that the assignment of countries to a low output or high output equilibrium can be achieved by












[α + β + λ − γ(1 + λ)]
(15)
where a given country is in a high output equilibrium if a<a ∗. When the numerator is positive, this critical value for
a is decreasing in the magnitude of the externality parameter, λ, and increasing in the exponent on land, β.T h e g r e a t e r
the extent of increasing returns, the lower is a∗, the fewer economies for which a<a ∗and so the higher the number of
economies found to be in a poverty trap.
By differentiating (15) with respect to α and γ, it is also possible to establish conditions under which a∗ is decreasing
in α and increasing in γ. These conditions, however, are functions of the three technology parameters (α, β, γ)a n da l s ot h e
agricultural employment and output shares, a and s, and so must be evaluated using the data. The conditions are satisﬁed
for almost every single country in our data set when evaluated at our assumed parameter values, but cannot be assumed to
hold more broadly.
We therefore investigate the sensitivity of our ﬁndings using graphical methods. The four panels of Figure 5 show the
fraction of the 127 countries that are found to be in a low output equilibrium, for various conﬁgurations of parameters. From
the top-right panel, it is clear that the incidence of poverty traps is increasing in λ and decreasing in β, as our theoretical
analysis shows. The other panels show the more complex patterns associated with varying the other technology parameters,
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Figure 4: AGGREGATE TFP MEASURES
NOTES: Kernel density estimates for the observed distribution of aggregate TFP across countries and a selection of the counterfactuals
discussed in the text. Bandwidths were chosen using Sheather and Jones’ (1991) plug-in method. The kernel is a univariate standard
normal density function.
α, γ and λ, in each case holding one constant and varying the other two.
The second aspect of our sensitivity analysis is more subtle. Recall that we have quantiﬁed the output gain associated
with an equilibrium switch, for each country in the data set. The size of these output gains depends on the returns to scale
in the two sectors, but also on the magnitude of the intersectoral wage gaps. This is because any wage gap corresponds
to a marginal product differential. This reinforces the output gain from reallocating labor to non-agriculture, given higher
marginal productivity in that sector.
One drawback of our version of the VRS model is that plausible values for technology parameters yield large inter-
sectoral wage differentials.22 It does seem possible that our previous analysis overstates the extent of marginal product
differentials, and therefore overstates the output effects of an equilibrium switch. In the remainder of this section, we inves-
tigate the importance of this effect. To do this, we use a simple trick that allows lower wage differentials to be considered
while retaining our other assumptions. The trick is to assume that a certain fraction of agricultural output,  , is unmeasured
in the national accounts. Some agricultural output may be produced for non-marketed household consumption, for example.
Under various assumptions about the magnitude of  , we adjust agriculture’s share in GDP for this mismeasurement, and
then recalculate the equilibrium solutions and the associated welfare effects.
One advantage of this approach is that it has a straightforward effect on the wage differential implicit in our calculations.
TheCobb-Douglas production functions imply thatmarginalproductsandwagesareproportionaltoaverageproducts. Since
assuming   =0 .5 implies that ‘true’ average labor productivity in agriculture is double that in the unadjusted data, it will
halve the ratio of wages in non-agriculture to agriculture that is implicit in our calculations.
The adjustments are easily made. We denote true agricultural output as Y ∗
a and measured agricultural output as Ya =
(1 −  )Y ∗
a . Hence true output is Y ∗ = Y ∗
a +pYn and measured output is Y = Ya +pYn. The data we have on agricultural
output shares correspond to s = Ya/(Ya +pYn). We want to calculate the ‘true’ or adjusted output shares s∗ = Y ∗
a /(Y ∗
a +
22A likely explanation is that the non-agricultural sector makes more intensive use of skilled labor than agriculture, but allowing for this is not straight-










































































Figure 5: ROBUSTNESS TO DIFFERENT PARAMETER ASSUMPTIONS
NOTES: This ﬁgure illustrates the importance of our assumptions regarding α,β,γ and λ for equilibrium assignment. Read-
ing across from the top-left: Panel 1: γ and β held ﬁx e da t0 . 3 5a n d0 . 2 0 .Panel 2: γ and α held ﬁxed at 0.35 and 0.40. Panel 3: α and
β held ﬁxed at 0.40 and 0.20. Panel 4: β and λ held ﬁxed at 0.20 and 0.30.
pYn). It is easy to show that the ‘true’ share can be expressed as:
s∗ =
s
1 −   + s 
Using this result, we adjust the output share data for various possible values of   and then recalculate some of our earlier
statistics. The results are shown in Table 4 for the case of λ =0 .10. The quantity of most interest is the output gain in
switching between equilibria. As   is increased from the benchmark case of accurate measurement (  =0 ) the effect of
an equilibrium switch on output diminishes, consistent with the lower wage ratios that are implicit in these calculations.
Yet the reductions in the output gain are relatively modest, implying that our earlier results are not driven simply by large
marginal product differentials across sectors.
9 Returns to capital
In this section we brieﬂy consider the implications of the VRS model for returns to capital. The model allows a simple
calculation of the ratio of gross marginal products of capital across the two interior equilibria. Given our use of Cobb-















  =0 .00 25.32 6 .07 4 .01 .70
  =0 .10 24.72 6 .07 4 .01 .67
  =0 .20 24.12 6 .87 3 .21 .61
  =0 .30 23.32 8 .37 1 .71 .54
  =0 .40 22.32 8 .37 1 .61 .49
  =0 .50 20.93 0 .76 9 .31 .41
Table 4: ROBUSTNESS OF MAIN RESULTS TO MIS-MEASURED AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
NOTES: Column (1) reports the ratio of the counterfactual variance of the log of GDP per worker, calculated when all countries are
in their high output equilibrium, to the observed variance. We consider various assumptions regarding the extent to which agricultural
output is undermeasured. Columns (2) and (3) show the consequences for the incidence of poverty traps, while column (4) reveals the





λ =0 .05 1.50/1.26
λ =0 .10 1.64/1.48
λ =0 .20 1.95/1.66
λ =0 .30 2.11/1.68
λ =0 .50 2.57/1.96
Table 5: RETURNS TO CAPITAL ACROSS EQUILIBRIA
NOTES: Column (1) reports mean and median ratios of the gross marginal product of capital across high and low output equilibria for
countries found to be in a low output equilibrium.












where s and x denote the agricultural output share and capital allocation in the low output equilibrium, and s0 and x0 the
corresponding variables for the high output equilibrium. Λ is the ratio of output across the two equilibria, as given by (10).
Based on our previous results, Table 5 reports mean and median values for the ratio of gross returns to capital across the
two equilibria, for countries found to be in a low output equilibrium. As before, we consider a range of possible values for
the externality parameter λ.
It is well known that standard growth models predict a fall in the return to capital as development proceeds, if economies
are converging to a steady-state position from below, so that the output-capital ratio is falling. Table 5 indicates that, if
growth is partly an outcome of equilibrium switching, the effect of a switch is to offset the decline in the return to capital.
This also implies that the VRS model can help in explaining the lack of capital ﬂows to poorer countries, although the size
of the effect is too small to be a complete resolution of this puzzle.
1810 Conclusion
Although models with multiple equilibria are a popular explanation for the gulf between rich and poor nations, few papers
have investigated the empirical relevance of such models. In this paper, we have examined the quantitative implications of
a simple model of multiplicity from the VRS class of models in trade theory. We have shown that one such model can be
calibrated in a way that greatly limits the need for parameter assumptions and data, and we have exploited this property in
order to calibrate the model for 127 countries.
This exercise gives rise to a number of interesting ﬁndings. Sections 6 and 8 established that, depending on the choice of
parameters, a substantial fraction of countries are found to be in a low output equilibrium, under the maintained assumptions
of the model. Moreover, the gains from moving to a high output equilibrium can be sizeable. An immediate corollary is
that multiple equilibria can explain a signiﬁcant fraction of the international inequality in output per worker.
This explanation is by no means a complete one, however. Holding all else constant, a switch to a more productive
equilibrium can easily increase output by a factor of two or more, with the precise ﬁgure depending on the returns to scale
in the two sectors and on the characteristics of individual countries. This is a substantial gain, but falls a long way short of
explaining the difference in output per worker between, say, the USA and Niger. The model cannot explain the full extent
of the international variation in living standards unless we posit an implausibly strong degree of increasing returns.
The model also implies that only the poorest, predominantly agricultural economies are in a low output equilibrium.
Hence, although the VRS model can explain some of the output gap between poor countries and middle income countries,
it cannot explain why labor productivity in middle income Latin America and East Asia remains below that of the USA and
Western Europe.
The model we have used is a highly stylized one, and the underlying assumptions are strong. Although our calibration
results can offer some useful insights into the properties of the VRS model, nothing in this paper approaches a formal test
of its validity. Nor do we provide an explanation for why countries arrive at particular equilibria. For all these reasons, we
are keen to emphasize that our investigation of multiplicity is far too preliminary to draw any lessons for policy. Neverthe-
less, we think it is intriguing that even a simple model can give rise to such wide-ranging implications. The quantitative
investigation undertaken here has revealed a great deal about the potential explanatory power of one candidate model, and
its strengths and limitations. We believe this to be a promising way forward for research on multiple equilibria.
A Stability analysis
This appendix outlines a speciﬁcation for the dynamics which implies that both interior equilibria are locally stable. It also
brieﬂy discusses the approximation involved in our use of a simpler model for calibration purposes.
In specifying the dynamics, we retain the assumption that capital costlessly moves between sectors to equalize rental
rates, but now assume that labor migration is costly. In particular, migration costs are described by a convex cost function,
C( ˙ Ln,L n),w h e r eC1 > 0,C 11 > 0,C 2 > 0 and C12 > 0 and C(0,L n)=0 . Migration costs are increasing in the current
ﬂow of migrants to the non-agricultural sector and in the amount of labor employed in the non-agricultural sector, in both
cases due to crowding diseconomies.
The representative individual chooses the level of migration, ˙ Ln, to maximize the present discounted value of income
net of migration costs:






Ya + Yn − C( ˙ Ln,L n)
i
dτ (16)
where σis the discount rate. Since the representative individual is not a social planner she does not take into account the
presence of the agglomeration externality in the non-agricultural sector when choosing the optimal migration path. Neither
19does she internalize the externality generated by the crowding diseconomy in C(·).
We characterize the solution to the sequence problem deﬁned by (16) using a dynamic programming argument. From
the envelope theorem, and the fact that the representative individual does not internalize the effects of the agglomeration






e−σ(τ−t) [wn − wa]dτ (17)
where q is equal to the market value of having an additional unit of labor in non-agriculture instead of agriculture, namely,
the expected net present value of future wage premia that an individual realizes from migrating.
To derive a continuous time Bellman Equation we begin with the discrete time optimality condition:
V (Ln)=m a x
{ ˙ Ln}
h





n = Ln + ∆Ln.Rearranging yields:
σV(Ln)∆t =m a x
{ ˙ Ln}
h
(1 + σ∆t)(Ya + Yn − C( ˙ Ln,L n))∆t + V (L
0
n) − V (Ln)
i
Letting ∆t → 0 and setting all terms of dt2or higher equal to zero yields the continuous time Bellman Equation:
σV(Ln)dt =m a x
{ ˙ Ln}
h
(Ya + Yn − C( ˙ Ln,L n))dt + q ˙ Lndt
i
(18)
The ﬁrst order condition for optimal migration is:
C1( ˙ Ln,L n)=q (19)
Migrantsthereforeequate marginal movingcostswiththenetpresentvalue ofexpectedwagepremiafromswitchingsectors.
Inverting (19) yields the optimal migration rate:
˙ Ln = C
−1
1 (q,Ln) (20)
Migration is increasing in the discounted expected stream of future wage premia, q. Optimal behavior, or rationality, also
imposes constraints on the path of q over time. Differentiating (17) with respect to time yields:
σq = wn − wa + ˙ q (21)
The cost of staying in the non-agricultural sector, σq, equals the current wage premium, wn − wa, plus “capital gains”
or increases in the expected value of future wage premia, ˙ q. Equation (21) makes explicit the importance of expectations
regarding future wage paths on migration behavior. Positive migration from agriculture to non-agriculture may occur, even
if such a movement is associated with an instantaneous wage loss, when the long run gains from switching sectors are
expected to be high.
To evaluate the local stability properties of the dynamic system deﬁned by (20) and (21) we linearize the system around
a steady state. For simplicity consider the case where C(·,·) takes a quadratic form such that C( ˙ Ln,L n)=1 /2η1( ˙ Ln)2 +
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Figure 6: EXPECTATIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM STABILITY
NOTES: The ﬁgure depicts the migration dynamics for the system deﬁned by the system of differential equations (22) and (21). The
ﬁgure illustrates that under our fully speciﬁed migration process both of the interior equilibria are locally stable and thus observable under
occasional perturbation. However, our migration model also gives rise to local indeterminacy, generating multiple perfect foresight paths
for any given initial labor allocation.
(1/2η2)(Ln + f) ˙ Ln;where f represents ﬁxed moving costs. We can then rewrite (20) as:
˙ Ln = η1q −
η1
η2
(Ln + f) (22)











The roots of the linearized system (ς1,ς2)a r ed e ﬁned by tr(A)=ς1 + ς2 and det(A)=ς1ς2.A s u f ﬁcient condition
for local stability of all equilibria is therefore σ<
η1
η2.23 The interaction of expectations, increasing returns, and a small
crowding diseconomy can result in local stability of all interior equilibria if individuals are sufﬁciently patient (small σ)o r
the crowding diseconomy is relatively strong (small η2).
A set of representative dynamics for the system deﬁned by (21) and (22) are depicted in Figure 6. The dynamics of the
system can be quite complex, but all our empirical exercise requires is local stability of the two interior equilibria. This is a
sufﬁcient condition for both equilibria to be observable under occasional perturbation. For a more detailed discussion of the
interaction between expectations and stability in the context of increasing returns, see Howitt and McAfee (1988), Krugman
(1991), and Matsuyama (1991). Graham (2000) provides an extensive discussion in the context of the present model.
We now brieﬂy discuss the implications of this analysis for the equilibrium wage gap. The dynamics for Lnand q
23Saddle-stability holds when det(A) < 0, which holds at the high output equilibrium, but not the low output equilibrium.
21described by (21) and (22) imply that in equilibrium, the intersectoral wage gap will equal
wn − wa =
σ
η2
(Ln + f). (24)
In contrast, the model we calibrate is based on a simpler equilibrium condition, namely that the wage ratio is the same for
both equilibria. Hence we must think of our calibrated model as only an approximation to the one analyzed here, with its
more complete speciﬁcation of the migration process. In the more complete model, equation (24) shows that the wage gap
between sectors is greater in the high output than in the low output equilibrium. This is potentially compatible with our
calibration assumption that the wage ratio is ﬁxed across equilibria. Since wages are greater in the high output than in the
low output equilibrium, a ﬁxed wage ratio corresponds to a wage gap that is greater in the high output equilibrium.
BC a l i b r a t i o n
This appendix shows how to derive an expression that an alternative equilibrium factor allocation must satisfy, and thus
forms the basis for our calibration exercise. It also sketches a proof that there will be at most two interior equilibria, under
a parameter restriction described below, and provides a simple method for distinguishing whether an observed economy is
in a low or high output equilibrium.





n are the agricultural and non-agricultural output levels associated with the alternative equilibrium, if one exists. The
derivation starts from the payment of private marginal products to capital and labor:
















We substitute the expressions for wages into the labor market equilibrium condition (4), which implies:












This indicates that we can express the ratio of value added in the two sectors as a function of the technology parameters, the


















This equation demonstrates that the intersectoral wage differential (wn/wa =1+δ) is a function of the technology para-
meters and the observable variables a and s.
Anequationofthisformmust alsoholdinanyalternativeequilibriumwithincompletespecialization. Forthisalternative
equilibrium, we use v to denote agriculture’s share of value added, and b the share of employment allocated to agriculture.



































Next we derive an equation for the proportion of capital allocated to agriculture, x, in the observed equilibrium. We














sα +( 1− s)γ
(34)
where the last line uses marginal productivity factor pricing (so that rKa/Ya = α, see equation 26) and the identity that
holds for the aggregate capital share (r ¯ K/Y = sα +( 1− s)γ).
Once again, if there is an alternative equilibrium with incomplete specialization, the fraction of capital allocated to
































The system of equations is completed by making use of the production functions, to write down the ratio of agricultural




















[(1 − z)K]γ(1+λ)[Anh(1 − b)L](1−γ)(1+λ) (37)














The next step is to use the two equations for the intersectoral capital allocations (x and z) to eliminate these variables
































23Figure 7: ON THE NUMBER OF EQUILIBRIA
NOTES: An example sketch of log g(a), the horizontal line, and log g(b), the curve. This sketch indicates that there will be at
most two interior equilibria under strict concavity of log g(b).
which can be expressed as equation (7) in the text.
This has reduced the system to one equation and one unknown, b. The solutions for b ∈ (0,1) represent all the interior
allocations of labor that satisfy the equilibrium conditions, one of which will be the observed equilibrium labor allocation
a and the other an alternative equilibrium allocation, where it exists. The underlying intersectoral capital allocations are
easily recovered using equations (33) and (35).
We nowinvestigate the numberof equilibria, andalsoprovide a simple way to distinguish whether an observed economy
is in a low output or high output equilibrium. To ﬁnd the equilibrium solutions, we are essentially solving for the roots of
the equation in b that is formed by rewriting (39) as:
g(b) − g(a)=0 (40)













and g(a) is a known quantity ﬁxed by the data and our parameter assumptions. We now show that under the parameter
restriction






there will be at most two equilibria with incomplete specialization.
The underlying idea of the proof can be gained by considering a plot of logg(a) and logg(b) against all the potential
values of b, that is for b ∈ (0,1). An example is shown in Figure 7. Since g(a) is a known quantity, logg(a) is a horizontal
line. The intersections of logg(b) with this horizontal line correspond to the possible equilibrium employment allocations,
since at these points g(a)=g(b).N o t ea l s ot h a tg(0) = 0 and g(1) = 0.
Hence a sufﬁcient condition for there to exist at most two solutions for b between zero and one is that the curve logg(b)
should be strictly concave. This implies that logg(b) crosses the straight line logg(a) twice at most, for values of b where
0 <b<1.
24To show strict concavity of logg(b), we will use (40) to write:
g(b)=bβ (1 − b)
λ [1 − bk]
θ (42)





a and θ = α−γ(1+λ). Note that our parameter restriction (41) corresponds to assuming θ+λ>0
and 0 <k .A l s o ,s i n c ea, s, α and γ all lie between zero and one, then k<1.
If θ>0 then it is easy to show that the logarithm of (42) is strictly concave. We now show that this property also holds














+( θ + λ)log(1− bk) (43)
Since the sum of strictly concave functions is strictly concave, all we need to show is that each of the three terms in (43)
is strictly concave. For the ﬁrst term, this is obvious by inspection. It is straightforward to show that the ﬁnal term is also
strictly concave (noting that θ + λ>0 by assumption).
















and this implies that the second term is also strictly concave in b, given our assumption that 0 <k<1. This completes
our sketch of the proof that, under the parameter restriction (41), there will be at most two equilibria with incomplete
specialization.
We can also use this result to infer from the observed employment and output shares whether an economy is in its best
available equilibrium or one with lower output. Consider the derivative of g(b) with respect to b. The key idea is that for an
observed economy to be in its high output equilibrium, and therefore at the leftmost intersection in the ﬁgure, this derivative
should be greater than zero when evaluated at b = a. Conversely if the derivative is less than zero when evaluated at a,t h e
economy must be in a low output equilibrium. There is also a knife-edge case where the derivative of g(b) with respect to
b, evaluated at a, is zero. Given strict concavity of logg(b) this implies that there is only one interior equilibrium.
We can use this idea to generate a condition on the observed employment share (a) that reveals whether or not a given
economy’s sectoral structure is consistent with a high output equilibrium. The derivative of g(b) with respect to b,e v a l u a t e d















Since ak < 1 and therefore g(a) > 0, the sign of the above expression can be evaluated from the bracketed term alone.
Substituting in for θ and k, and rearranging, we can rewrite the necessary condition for a high output equilibrium, namely












[α + β + λ − γ(1 + λ)]
This is the critical value discussed at several points in the main text.
We now turn to the output effects associated with equilibrium switching, by showing how to calculate the ratio of output
in the alternative equilibrium to that in the current one. Here we use b to denote the alternative equilibrium labor allocation




















































Substituting in the expressions for z and x and simplifying yields the output ratio associated with an equilibrium switch,
equation (10) in the text.
C Data sources
Our data on the sectoral structure of output and employment come primarily from the World Development Indicators 2000
CD-ROM. This source is supplemented where necessary with ﬁgures drawn from the United Nations’ Yearbook of National
Accounts Statistics (1980) and its successor National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables (1991,
1994, 1995), The United Nations’ Statistical Yearbook CD-ROM,v a r i o u sWorld Development Reports, and Mitchell’s
(1998a, 1998b, 1998c) handbooks of historical statistics. In a few cases, the ﬁgures were obtained directly from national
sources, but over 90 percent of the observations are drawn directly from World Bank or UN sources.
Our dataset for the TFP calculations builds upon that assembled by Hall and Jones (1999). We use their GDP per worker
data, as well as their aggregate human and physical capital stock estimates. We add an estimate of agricultural land area
using data from the FAO Yearbook: Production. Our measure corresponds to arable and pastoral land combined. Since the
Hall and Jones (1999) output data are measured net of mining output, we adjust our sectoral value added data accordingly,
using their estimate for the fraction of total GDP due to mining. Data limitations preclude a corresponding adjustment to
the employment data, so we assume that total employment in the mining sector is zero. The distortions introduced by this
assumption are modest given the enclave nature of mining and its high capital intensity. Even in a highly mineral dependent
economy such as Botswana, where roughly one half of GDP is due to mining, less than ﬁve percent of the labor force works
in the mining sector.
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